

U Plug, We Play

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Who am I?

David Middlehurst

Twitter: @dtmsecurity

- Security Consultant / Engineer
- Specialisms:
 - Application Security
 - Develops Security Testing Tools
- Previous Internal / Client Research
 - Near Field Communications (NFC)
 - Virtualisation







Agenda

- Introduce UPnP
- Brief overview of UPnP specification
- Introduce a new UPnP assessment tool
- Tool overview
- Discover UPnP targets
- Interact with UPnP targets
- Learn and save UPnP targets
- Spoof UPnP targets on the network
- Demo
- UPnP device authorisation
- Common Flaws
- Implications of these flaws
- Places you should expect to find bugs
- Conclusion
- How to get the tool





UPnP

Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) allows devices to discover each others presence on a network and identify services that are available







UPnP – Basic Discovery

Two main methods

- Devices can announce that they are there by sending a "NOTIFY" packet
- Devices can send out an "M-SEARCH" request asking for devices to reveal themselves if they meet the specified requirements





UPnP – NOTIFY Packet

Devices periodically send multicast UDP packets to indicate they are online. This includes headers for the type of service they are offering and the URL to the XML device description.

NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1

Cache-Control: max-age = 300 Host: 239.255.255.250:1900

Location:

http://192.168.0.15:8080/01c18570-b4a4-

4356-8afa-5eeac61aa583/NT: urn:schemas-upnp-

org:service:WANPPPConnection:1

NTS: ssdp:alive

SERVER: UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit

USN: uuid:85e5f606-c406-4c89-8af3-

5fc4ef27ee18







UPnP - M-SEARCH

A device can probe for other UPnP devices by sending an M-SEARCH request. This can include a header asking for devices that have a specific service.

M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1

HOST:239.255.255.250:1900

ST: ssdp:all

MAN: "ssdp:discover"

MX:2







UPnP - M-SEARCH

Devices respond by sending a 'HTTP 1/1 200" response via UDP to the source IP and source port that the M-SEARCH packet originated from.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control:max-age = 300
Date:
ST: urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:ContentDirectory:1
USN:uuid
Location: http://192.168.0.15:8080/01c18570-b4a4-4356-8afa-5eeac61aa583/
OPT:"http://schemas.upnp.org/upnp/1/0/"; ns=01
01-NLS:
Server: UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit
Ext:
```



New Tool Is Born – "UPnP Pentest Toolkit"


Motivation:

Lack of a security focused tool which provides easy access to the required information and allowed easy interaction and a framework to add new ideas.

Aim:

The aim of this tool is to bring together a range of UPnP assessment features, enabling a quick security assessment with minimal configuration and set-up.





BecomeGroupCoordinator



Windows GUI tool

Written in C#


Uses the libraries:

- Managed UPnP
- PcapDotNet






Discovery






Interaction







Interaction














Learning




Spoofing



rol	Web Server			Saved Device	
twork Interface:	162 hits				
Network adapter "Microsoft" on local host) rpcap://\Device\NPF_{CEEA		Use Custom URL	Web Server Port: 9090	Load Saved Device	Clear
		3203b3b9-d878-49a3-b6e7-c761fe154921/		Load Saved Device	Clear
		2030303-0070-4383-00e7-C70 He 13432 I7			
Start Stop Cycle U	ON GUID SCPD URL:				
	http://192.168.0.6:9090/d	http://192.168.0.6:9090/db9c455d-4ce8-42f6-b8df-e56e301aeef1/			
ertise UPnP Device:	Log:			No Device Loaded	
TIFY Beacon: TIFY*HTTP/1.1 he-Control: max-age = 300 t: 239.255.255.250:1900 ation: http://192.168.0.6:9090/3203b3b9-d878-49a3-b6e7-c761fe154: upnp prootdevice 8: ssdp:alive NVER: UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit N: uuid:3203b3b9-d878-49a3-b6e7-c761fe154921	/32815190-4878-4923-1-667	GET from: 192.168.0.13:55893 [25/06/2014 22:03:33] /32031530-0878-4993-56e7-c761fe154921/ GET from: 192.168.0.13:55896 Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible, Aggregation, Twonky, 7.3, Windows 6.2 (Build 9200); x86 64) DNADOC/1.50 [25/06/2014 22:03:32] /db9c455d-4ce8-4276-b8df-e58e301zeef1/ GET from: 192.168.0.13:55895 Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible, Aggregation, Twonky, 7.3, Windows 6.2 (Build 9200); x86 64) DNADOC/1.50 [25/06/2014 22:03:32] /3203b3b9-6878-493-b6e7-c761fe154921/ GET from: 192.168.0.13:55895 [25/06/2014 22:03:32] /3203b3b9-6878-493-b6e7-c761fe154921/ GET from: 192.168.0.13:55892 [25/06/2014 22:03:33] /3203b3b9-6878-493-b6e7-c761fe154921/ Current Device Description:			
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Spoofing












Spoofing – Learnt Device









Spoofing – Learnt Device



ntrol		Web Server			Saved Device
letwork Interface:		1599 hits			
Network adapter 'Microsoft' on local host) rpcap://\Device\NI	PF_{CEEA36BB-8 ▼		Use Custom URL	Web Server Port: 9090	
		Device Description URL: http://192.168.0.6:9090/3203b3b3		Web Server Folt.	Load Saved Device Clear
Start Stop Cycle UDN GUID		SCPD URL: http://192.168.0.6:9090/db9c455d-4ce8-42/6-b8df-e56e301aeef1/			
					Device:
		Log:			foobar2000 Renderer (dtm_000) [ZERO]
NOTIFY Beacon: NOTIFY* HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: max-age = 300 Host: 239.255.255.250:1900 Location: http://192.168.0.6:9090/3203b3b9-d878-49a3-b6e7-c761fe154921/ NT: um.dial-multiscreen-org:service:dial:1 NTS: ssdp:alive SERVER: UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit USN: uuid:3203b3b9-d878-49a3-b6e7-c761fe154921		6ET from: 192.168.0.13:4727 [25/66/2014 22:14:39] /328339b-4878-493-b6er-7cf1cf154921/ 6ET from: 192.168.0.13:4725 [25/66/2014 22:14:38] /328339b-4878-493-b6er-7cf1cf154921/ 6ET from: 192.168.0.13:4724 [25/66/2014 22:14:38] /328339b-4878-493-b6er-7cf1cf154921/ 6ET from: 192.168.0.13:4701 [25/66/2014 22:14:37] /328339b-4878-493-b6er-7cf1cf154921/ 6ET from: 192.168.0.13:4700 [25/66/2014 22:14:37] /328339b-4878-493-b6er-7cf1cf154921/ Current Device Description: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/journal.com/doi.org/10.1001/journal.</td><td rowspan=2 colspan=2> GetCurrent TransportActions GetDeviceCapabilities GetMediaInfo GetPositionInfo GetTransportInfo GetTransportSettings Next Pause Play Previous Seek SetAVTransportURI SOAPAction Log: Source: 192.168.0.4:62662 SOAP Action: Stop Request:</td></tr><tr><td colspan=2>Seacon Interval (ms): 1000 Source IP 192 168 0 6</td><td colspan=3>0"><specversion><major>1</major><minor>0</minor></specversion><device><devicetype>um:s chemas-upnp-org;device:Media Renderer:1</devicetype><firendlyname>foobar2000 Renderer (dtm_000) [ZERO] Pujos Nedal Pujos<!--</td--></firendlyname></device>			
st IP:	1000	Fuzz cases:			<s:envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soa</s:envelope
9 255 255 250	1900			e tag <fuzz-here> above</fuzz-here>	/envelope/"
Search Responder	1300	Open Load Fuzz Ca		es (For each known device type)	s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoaj org/soap/encoding/"> <s:body><u:stop.xmlns:u="um:schemas- upnp-org:service:AVTransport:1"> 0 </u:stop.xmlns:u="um:schemas- </s:body>
arted Capture] Network adapter 'Microsoft' on local host	Request:		Response:	s (For each known device type)	
S-search from 192.168.0.13:54680[25/06/2014 22:14:28] -Search from 192.168.0.13:64766[25/06/2014 22:14:28] -Search from 192.168.0.13:64766[25/06/2014 22:14:28] -Search from 192.168.0.13:6476[25/06/2014 22:13:28] -Search from 192.168.0.13:56724[25/06/2014 22:13:44] -Search from 192.168.0.13:56724[25/06/2014 22:13:44] -Search from 192.168.0.13:56420[25/06/2014 22:13:28] -Search from 192.168.0.6:54934[25/06/2014 22:13:28] -Search from 192.168.0.6:54934[25/06/2014 22:13:29]	From: 192.168.0.13:54680 M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 ST: upnprootdevice MX: 3 MAN: "ssdp:discover" HOST: 239.255.255.250:19	Î	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control max-age = 300 Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 21:14: ST upnp prootdevice USN:uuid:3203b3b9-d878-49a: Location http://192.168.0.6:90 b6e7-7.67fe154921/	3-b6e7-c761fe154921	<pre> Response: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> </pre>



Demo



Authorisation - Good Vendor Practices









Authorisation - Bad Vendor Practices



 Mostly it's a case of:
 "What do you mean by authorisation?"


- Security by obscurity
 - Looking for fixed User Agents
 - Deviating from the specification slightly



Flaws – M-SEARCH Spoofing



"Devices respond by sending a 'HTTP 1/1 200" response via UDP to the **source IP** and **source port** that the M-SEARCH packet originated from."



60% of devices* I looked at will respond to any routable destination

* Devices that should respond to M-SEARCH requests i.e. Media Servers responding to Media Players

Of these device mostly all devices did not care about what UDP port they send traffic to. Those that did disallowed low ports i.e. 1-1024



Flaws – External Device URL's



NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1

Cache-Control: max-age = 300 Host: 239.255.255.250:1900

Location: http://192.168.0.6:9090/685f34e2-9a75-

49c8-b642-2b1586ad4433/

NT: urn:schemas-upnp-

org:service:WANPPPConnection:1

NTS: ssdp:alive

SERVER: UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit

USN: uuid:685f34e2-9a75-49c8-b642-2b1586ad4433

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Cache-Control:max-age = 300

Date:Wed, 25 Jun 2014 22:19:27 GMT

ST:upnp:rootdevice

USN:uuid:685f34e2-9a75-49c8-b642-2b1586ad4433

Location:http://192.168.0.6:9090/685f34e2-9a75-49c8-

b642-2b1586ad4433/

OPT: "http://schemas.upnp.org/upnp/1/0/"; ns=01 01-NLS: 2404a5f72618151d22759c04a8cad0b6

Server: UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit

Ext:

What happens if we specify a URL outside of the local subnet i.e. the internet

40% of devices / apps* that I looked at will make requests to any routable destination

* That actually have a need to go and get device URLs i.e. Media Players looking for Media Servers

Of these device mostly all devices did not care about what TCP port they send traffic to.

Flaws – External Traffic




Possible implications of UPnP services not taking note of where they are sending traffic

- Sounds like Denial of Service (DoS)?
 - Attacker sends one packet → Multiple packets sent to a target
 - Attacker sends one packet → Multiple devices send packets to a target
 - Send a small packet → Bigger packets sent to a target
- Influence over audit activity:
 - Malware Beacon Signatures
 - Dodgy Web Sites
- Port scanning
- Trust Boundaries...

Trust Boundaries

UPnP





Connect your work laptop to your home LAN (Untrusted)

You have some UPnP service i.e. Running a media player

Attacker on your home LAN can cause UDP/TCP traffic on your work LAN (Trusted)

Bugs to look for




- Do devices and apps impose limits on the size of files they attempt to download?
- Do they assume that all they have to process is a small XML file?
- How do they handle traditional XML base attacks? i.e. XML Entity Injection (XXE)
- When they have parsed the information do they safely handle it?

Memory Management



Many UPnP implementations reviewed have problems i.e. Lots of iOS apps



Where are we heading?



"UPnP+ will expand beyond the group's traditional work on devices using Internet Protocol on WiFi LANs to create bridges to wide-area networks and non-IP devices."

"Today there's not a good standard for accessing devices across any network, but UPnP [Forum] is working on it," said Alan Messer, a Samsung researcher in San Jose who is vice president of UPnP [Forum]."

Conclusion



- I think UPnP can be a hidden gem on security assessments
- The more a security professional experiences UPnP the more alarm bells start to ring
- Vendor best practices vary to huge degree
- I have introduced new common classes of bug. I am sure there are plenty of bugs to be identified.
- Hopefully UPnP Pentest Toolkit will be a useful tool for people who want to assess UPnP targets or get started with carrying out research in this area
- The future looks even more scary! Watch this space, hopefully I will present on some of this in the years to come

Get UPnP Pentest Toolkit





Goto: upnp.ninja

NCC Group GitHub:

https://github.com/nccgroup/UPnP-Pentest-Toolkit

Keep updated



Tool:

Via GitHub page or the 'About' Dialog

Research:

Follow

@dtmsecurity@nccgroupinfosec







Questions?





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